President Daniel Chapo will be the Frelimo’s presidential candidate in 2029, Frelimo has announced. The very early announcement gives unexpected party backing to Chapo. But the announcement itself was only made by Frelimo Secretary General Chakil Aboobacar on 18 October (O Pais, MediaFax 19 Oct). It had been decided by the Central Committee at its meeting in Chimoio on 26 August, he said. But there had been no announcement, and Aboobacar’s press conference appears to come only after a meeting of the Frelimo Political Commission. The PC is composed of 17 of the most powerful people in Frelimo, who with the former presidents – Chissano, Guebuza and Nyusi – control Frelimo and thus to a great extent rule Mozambique.
Armando Guebuza (president 2005-15), a party oligarch, gained substantial personal power as president and his government was responsible for the secret debt. The Political Commission responded by delaying the choice of the next presidents until the last minute, just a few months before the election. And the PC selected relatively unknown middle level officials, Filipe Nyusi (2015-25) and Daniel Chapo (2025-present), who the party expected to control. But the unexpected demonstrations after the 2024 elections shocked Frelimo. Suddenly Chapo, who had only ever been a provincial governor, had the task of resolving the ongoing crisis. His very early nomination for 2029 shows he has proved adept at tackling some of the most glaring problems without unduly upsetting the Frelimo oligarchs and factions, who have now given their approval after delaying the announcement.
Chapo has three interconnected tasks. First keeping Frelimo in political control. Second, giving Frelimo increasing control of the economy while curbing the greed and corruption that caused the demonstrations. And third to gain the international support that will keep a bankrupt Mozambique functioning. Finally we point to a fourth issue that appears to be off the agenda by agreement – the war in Cabo Delgado.
Political control
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The 2024 election was a blatant fraud, as shown by the Public Integrity Centre (CIP) and its 500 correspondents. There was only token criticism from the international community, so Frelimo is convinced it can do that again in 2029 – or delay the election. The two traditional opposition parties, Renamo and Podemos, and both collapsing because of internal fights.
The new opposition figure, Venâncio Mondlane, is charismatic and good with social media, but he goes on trial Tuesday (17 Nov) by the Supreme Court for treason for the demonstrations. Speaking at the Berlin Freedom Conference on 10 November, he said he would return to Mozambique for the trial. Frelimo’s hope is that he will stay away, flee the country or be jailed.
The accurate and trusted tabulator of political violence Platforma Decide published its latest report Thursday (12 Nov). It reports 914 people are currently detained without trial by police, many since the post-election demonstrations two years ago. In the period March-October this year, there were 50 incidents of political violence, many by police and security services. There were 8 deaths and 13 injuries, some by fire arms, and 18 arrests. Of the 50 people affected by violence, 44 are members of Anamola, Venâncio Mondlane’s party, Decide reports.
Frelimo is worried about the reaction to the trial. In some places police officers’ holidays have been cancelled. The prison service ordered its highest level of combat readiness across all prisons from Monday. The directive gives particular attention to prisons affected by incursions and prisoner releases during the 2024 unrest. Guards will be redeployed from administrative duties and patrols strengthened (Zitamar 22 Oct). OMR (Rural Observatory) which did some of the best reporting on the post-election demonstrations, has made a documentary using social media videos: ‘Isn’t this our country?’ (Não é nosso pais este aqui?) Political pressure recently stopped two showings in the downtown Cinema Scala, but OMR is arranging other local showings with discussions – if allowed.
Economic control
The imposition of the so-called ‘free market’ over the past 25 years gave transnational companies control of most natural resources while allowing a Frelimo elite control of large parts of the local economy, and permitted widespread corruption. This has been an important cause of the war in Cabo Delgado and the post-election demonstrations. Demands for bribes, fraud, and badly done and uncompleted building contacts have all caused discontent. Chapo is moving to curb the most egregious problems, while increasing Frelimo power and ensuring continued foreign earnings. Difficult for any juggler, because different interests clash.
An early move was against massive looting of two state companies, airline LAM and telecommunication company TMcel. LAM was put under control of three large state companies: Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB), Empresa Moçambicana de Seguros (EMOSE, insurance) and Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM, railways). All three are well run and skilled at dealing with Frelimo demands without destroying the company.
A key problem is a population growing faster than the economy, despite the huge mineral resources. Ordinary young people want jobs and a share of the resource wealth, which is the basis of the Cabo Delgado war and the post-election demonstrations. Oligarch’s extended families are growing and more Frelimo people want jobs, contracts and commissions, which puts pressure on the party. These two overlap.
Artisanal gold mining in Manica province is uncontrolled and destroying water supplies and farming zones. The biggest mining zone is ‘seis carros’ (6 cars). The mines are controlled by the local Frelimo elite and have 12,000 artisanal miners (garimpeiros). Gold is sold outside Mozambique, so the country gains little. Chapo tried to halt and regularise the gold mining by first banning it. The result is that mining simply moved to nighttime when it could not be controlled. Chapo did not have the power to control the local party elite, and the number of jobs is too great for local people to lose.
As with LAM, his alternative was to find things he could control. First is changes to mineral laws to force mining and gas companies to sign more contracts with local companies. Second is to centralise government import and purchase contracts, and make them more transparent so they can be monitored. The hope is to encourage Felimo-elite owned companies which create jobs and meet higher standards. Control of grain imports has had a bad start, involving pushing out a foreign owned company with a long and good history in Mozambique, which brought protests from the local business community.
The party is backing Chapo, but will it allow him the space to force party elite contractors to do a better job?
International support?
Faced with a major fiscal crisis at home and diminished foreign support after the stolen election, Chapo has opted for globetrotting and high level politics, personally meeting as many senior people possible. This has created some good will and promises of support, but little actual money so far.
Frelimo has a long history of gaining diverse support. During the independence war it was one of the few liberation movements to have support from both China and Soviet Union. After independence it joined the British, Portuguese and Islamic commonwealths. Chapo is now trying to play off China, Russia and the United States against each other. A visit to China in April led to an easing of debt repayments. He visited Russia in October. Soon after, on 5 November, US AFRICOM deputy commander Lt Gen John Brennan Jr. visited Maputo and met President Chapo. Brennan called Mozambique a “strategic partner” and pressed for more US military involvement, especially in Cabo Delgado. Accompanied by Peter Vrooman, US ambassador to Mozambique until last year and who is now AFRICOM’s civil-military deputy, Brennan met Mozambique’s Defence Minister, Cristóvão Chume. AFRICOM is the US military command for Africa.
On the day Chapo met Brennan, a US private security company Sincerus announced that it has been given $4mn for the US State Department to train and equip police to protect the N1 and N380 main north-south roads in Cabo Delgado, which are now subject to attacks and ransom kidnappings. (Mozambique Times 6 Nov)
Three visits to Portugal in the past year and meetings with Portuguese President António José Seguro and Prime Minister Luís Montenegro have generated promises of support and investment. Most recently, Chapo was in Turkey giving a speech Wednesday (11 Nov) to the COP31 to say Mozambique needs $37 billion for climate resilience; he also talked to Turkish investors. On his return he went to Abu Dhabi Friday (14 Nov) for a meeting the President Sheikh Mohamed looking for investments in agriculture, tourism, and energy.
Chapo has made the IMF a high profile issue. Under President Nyusi, and probably under Frelimo pressure, Mozambique made impossible commitments to the IMF in order to obtain a loan. Just when Chapo was taking office, the IMF threatened to cancel its Mozambique programme. The first move under Chapo was to convince the IMF in April 2025 to suspend but not cancel the programme.
Chapo’s moves started early this year. In March 2026 the government unexpectedly (and unnecessarily) fully paid its $630mn debt to the IMF. At the IMF Spring meetings in Washington in April, Finance Minister Carla Loveira met senior IMF officials and it was agreed that the IMF would send missions to Mozambique. In September Chapo met with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly annual high level meeting in New York. On 14 October Loveira, met with the IMF Deputy Managing Director, Bo Li, at the annual IMF meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. Bo Li encouraged Mozambique to maintain dialogue and engagement with the IMF. Olamide Harrisson, IMF’s Resident Representative in Mozambique, said on Wednesday (11 Nov) in Maputo that rising international fuel prices, foreign currency shortages and difficulties in managing public finances are increasing the vulnerabilities of Mozambique’s economy. The economy will grow by only 1% this year, less than population growth, he said. But, unlike a year ago, the IMF is talking to Mozambique, in part due to Chapo talking to top people.
Ignoring the war
The civil war in Cabo Delgado started and expanded during the Nyusi presidency. Rwandan troops were brought in, but the war continued to grow and spread across the province. Frelimo’s underlying policy has simply been to ignore the war. For five years the war stopped development of the gas. The agreement which allowed the recent restart of the gas was to construct a fortress around the gas liquification zone on the Afungi peninsula at Palma. The fortress has no land access and has Mozambican and Rwandan troops inside for protection. President Chapo told the UN General Assembly three weeks ago that “in Cabo Delgado, we have made progress in fighting terrorism and strengthening security.” Few observers would agree, and insurgents have free movement around nearly all of Cabo Delgado province and many local people support them.
In particular ignoring the war means claiming the there are no local grievances behind the war, and that it is all due to a “foreign hand” – which is increasingly rejected by domestic research and foreign observers. Indeed the local grievances of the young people fighting the are about no jobs or benefit from the mineral wealth, and a lack of power. These were a key part of the grievances of the post-election protesters. So far the two protests have not joined, and Frelimo assumes they will always be separate. Frelimo tries to keep researchers and journalists away from the war, but it has not worked.
Government confirmed last week that the gas bonanza is a decade away. Minister of State Administration Inocêncio Impissa told parliament Thursday (12 Nov) that the main source of gas revenue, corporate income tax, will only start being paid in 2035 and will reach $2.6bn per year only in 2042. That means there will be little to share between the oligarchs and young people demanding jobs not just for a second Chapo term, but for some years after – unless money can be raised from the IMF and foreign lenders, investors and donors.
Frelimo is betting that Chapo’s mix of using force on the opposition, trying to curb the oligarchs, looking for money abroad, and ignoring the war will keep Frelimo in control. But for how long? Can Chapo survive a second term? And after that? Jh
